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BANK COLLECTIONS AND PAR CLEARANCE
Despite increasing liberalism in other fields, our American coiurts seem
determined to compel banking practice to conform to established doc-
trines of law and steadfastly refuse to adapt the law to sound banking
practice. As one might expect, any such medieval legalistic principle
cannot be carried to its logical conclusion. The existence of banking
customs cannot be wholly ignored. Their partial and reluctant recog-
nition has led to some strange inconsistencies in the law of bank
collections and has confronted the banks with some curious problems
of law evasion.
COMMENTS
In the case of Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Malloy (1924,
U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 296, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the
apparently rigid rule that a bank acting as collection agent' of commer-
cial paper 2 is under a duty to the holder' to receive cash in payment, and
'Whether the "collection agent" is the bank which receives the paper for
collection or the bank which makes, attempts to make, or ought to make the actual
collection depends on the jurisdiction. According to the "New York rule" the
local bank has no authority to employ sub-agents and is responsible for their
conduct. National Revere Bank v. National Bank of the Republic (19o2) 172
N. Y. 102, 64 N. E. 799; Exchange National Bank v. Third National Bank (1884)
112 U. S. 276, 5 Sup. Ct. 141; Smith v. National Bank of D. 0. Mills & Co.
(1911, N. D. Calif.). 191 Fed. 226; Perry State Bank v. Myers (1923, Ark.) 251
S. W. 685; Magee, Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1913) 498. Under the "Massa-
chusetts rule" the holder is taken to know that the bank must use sub-agents to
perform the collection, and if the local bank with due diligence transmits the paper
to a competent sub-agent, its duty is said to be at an end. Lord v. Hingham
National Bank (1904) 186 Mass. 161, 71 N. E. 312; Stones River National Bank
v. Lerman Milling Co. (1913) 9 Ala. App. 322, 63 So. 776; Hoffman v. Mechanics-
American National Bank (1923, Mo. App.) 249 S. W. 168; see i Morse, Banks
and Banking (5th ed. 1917) 494. It is interesting to compare the cases which
originated the rules. Allen v. Merchants' Bank (1839, N. Y. Senate) 22 Wend.
215; East Haddam Bank v. Scovil (837) 12 Conn. 303; Fabens v. Mercantile
Bank (1839, Mass.) 23 Pick. 33o. All three were decided independently of each
other. The Massachusetts and Connecticut cases took into consideration the facts
of banking practice, while the New York case was decided on general principles
of agency. But it is to be noted that even the Massachusetts rule fails to regu-
late the whole situation satisfactorily. So far as concerns risk of negligence or
default of the sub-agent, it is sound enough. But when such sub-agent is con-
sidered the direct agent of the owner of the paper a number of established practices
both difficult to remove from banking and normally as convenient to the customer
as to the banker, rise to complicate the legal situation. Thus the original bank,
though taking items only for collection (the equivalent of "for transmission"
under the New York rule) often makes advances against the security of these
collections. The security for such advances consists in the factual assurance that
as, if, and when collected, the proceeds will return through the same channels.
See (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 177. But the Massachusetts rule of direct
agency deprives such assurance of any legal sanction. Moreover, the sub-agent
will of necessity in practice disregard the instructions of the ultimate principal,
save when transmitted through the accustomed and accredited channel-the original
bank. Such disregard, under the Massachusetts rule, might result in an action for
conversion, or even for important damages.
2 This comment is limited to (I) "clean" items, not attached to documents, and
(2) sight items; that is, to real exchange or payment paper, as opposed to credit
instruments. This will not, however, in the main, exclude notes or acceptances
made payable at a bank, put through for payment by that bank on the due day;
since at least on their due date the clause making such paper payable at the bank
and amounting to an order under N. I. L. sec. 87, makes the paper equivalent to
exchange paper, its life as credit paper having ended.
For the sake of clarity the word "checl' is used to indicate an instrument
drawn by the depositor on his local bank, and the word "draft" to indicate the
paper by means of which the drawee pays that obligation.
3 The collecting bank is the agent of the holder. Bank of Hatch v. Mossman
(1919) 25 N. M. 547, 185 Pac. 275; Krafft v. Citizens Bank (igio, ist Dept.)
139 App. Div. 61o, 124 N. Y. Supp. 214.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
accepts an exchange draft at its peril.4  The court by way of dictum
admits that if the custom were without exception to transmit the proceeds
of checks (not cleared through clearing houses or the books of the
Federal Reserve Banks) by receiving drafts of the drawee upon some
other banks, it might be permitted to control.5 But this ray of hope is
considerably dimmed by the court's curious assertio'n that "there is
nothing6 to prevent the sending bank from requiring the drawee to
remit currency as a condition upon which the check may be satisfied."
Yet only recently the same court in American Bank & Trust Co. v.
"This is so by the great weight of authority. Fanset v. Garden City State
Bank (19o9) 24 S. D. 248, 123 N. W. 686 (insolvency immediately after drawing
draft in payment) ; Bank of Shaw v. Ransom (1916) 112 Miss. 440, 73 So. 280
(drawee insolvent at time it gave draft in payment) ; (1922) 7 MINN. L. REv. 55.
The same is true even where the draft is drawn on the bank originally receiving the
check for collection. Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co. (1894) 149 Ill. 343, 36
N. E. 1029. But if other payment of the first check is refused, taking a draft
after protest of the first check is, of course, not negligence since no party is
discharged on the original paper. Citizens' Bank of Paris v. Houston (1895) 98
Ky. 139, 32 S. W. 397. In order to sue the agent for negligence, the holder must
elect to repudiate the transaction. National Bank of Commerce v. Johnson (I896)
6 N. D. i8o, 69 N. W. 49; Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester (19o8)
12o Tenn. 225, 1,, S. W. 248. As against the drawee, however, making the draft
and marking the original paper "paid" has in some cases been said to be payment
and to bind the drawee, and the subsequent discovery of the drawer's insolvency
held immaterial, even though the draft is still in the drawee's possession. Nine-
teenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank of South Weyiwuth (1903) 184 Mass.
49, 67 N. E. 670. Cf. Bradley Lumber Co. v. Bradley County Bank (1913, C. C. A.
8th) 206 Fed. 41. But see Figuers v. Fly (1917) 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S. W. 117.
For general propositions on extinguishing a prior debt by means of commercial
paper, see (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) I. An exception to the rule is that a collect-
ing bank can take a check on itself or one of its depositors. Bartley v. State
(1898) 53 Neb. 310, 73 N. W. 744; (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 437. Unless
it knows itself to be insolvent. Sanitary Can Co. v. National Pickle & Canning
Co. (1921) 191 Iowa, 1259, 184 N. W. 354. But a bank is never liable for taking
a worthless check where no prejudice results. Interstate National Bank v. Ringo
(1905) 72 Kan. 116, 83 Pac. Iig; Bellevue Bank v. Security National Bank (1915)
I68 Iowa, 707, 15o N. W. 1076. A possible justification for the general rule may
be found in public policy: it makes all commercial paper more stable if the banks
bear such risks, and the loss will ultimately be distributed over the entire business
community in the form of higher interest rates. The force of this argument is
greatly weakened by the fact that most banks contract themselves out of this
liability. See infra note 15.
'Custom was held a justification in Jefferson County Savings Bank v. Coinmer-
cial National Bank (1897) 98 Tinn. 337, 39 S. W. 338, on the theory of an implied
agreement by the principal that the agency be performed in the usual way. And
see Albert v. State Bank (1912, App. T.) 78 Misc. 56, 138 N. Y. Supp. 237;
contra: Dorchester v. Merchants' National Bank (1914, Tex.) 163 S. W. 5. The
evidence against the universality of the custom in the principal case seems consider-
ably distorted in the opinion.
' Does the court realize how many kinds of expense: loss of interest, insurance
and loss of clearing benefits would be involved by shipment of currency, or how
infrequent such shipment is in practice?
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Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta7 noted some of the reasons why drawee
banks have come to rely on the custom of paying their obligations by
means of drafts. That case arose out of the attempt of the Federal
Reserve Banks to effectuate universal par clearance. Country banks
have strenuously resisted par clearance because a large part of their
profits consists of the small exchange charges which they arbitrarily
deduct from the amount of every draft remitted by them at a distance
in payment of checks drawn on them and which it is the purpose of
par clearance to eliminate.8 Another important source of income is the
interest paid on the deposits in city banks against which they draw these
drafts. In trying to bring them to terms the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta struck a double blow. It undertook to collect checks over the
counters of recalcitrant banks, thus forcing them to pay in cash the
face value of the checks. This eliminated the exchange charge, and it
also deprived the banks of interest by compelling them to maintain large
amounts of cash in their own vaults. The Supreme Court enjoined
the Reserve Bank from collecting checks "except in the usual way."
True, the undenied allegations of the bill declared that the Reserve Bank
was accumulating checks on the country banks and presenting them in
large and irregular batches in order to compel them to keep on band
an excessive amount of cash;9 and when on retrial the allegations were
(1921) 256 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. 499.
8The face value of the paper may be diminished by charges at both ends: a
collecting charge made by the bank receiving the paper for the service of collecting
or of forwarding for collection, and an exchange charge made by the drawee for
the service of remitting payment to a distant point. Ordinarily a bank will not
charge a fee for collection to a regular customer. But the service is not gratuitous.
The fact that it is taken in the course of business is sufficient evidence of considera-
tion. Exchange National Bank v. Third National Bank, supra note I. The
exchange charge originated from the fiction that the drawee bank in addition to
its bookkeeping cost was forced to go to the expense of shipping specie to meet
checks. Magee, The Fight Against Par Clwck Collection (1923) 31 JOURNAL OF
POLITIcAL ECONOmy, 433. Since payments are actually made by sending in checks
and drafts received in the course of business, the drawee banks, when challenged
by the Federal Reserve Banks, tried to justify themselves on the theory that they
were serving the Federal Reserve bank by selling it a draft just as they would iell
one to a customer. (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 517. The truth is that the Federal
Reserve is performing a service for the non-member bank and is bearing the entire
expense even to the sending of stamped envelopes for the return of the draft.
The insistence of the country banks on the exchange charge is well illustrated in
Washington Loan & Banking Co. v. Folly Beach Corp. (1922) 154 Ga. 366, 114
S. E. 207. For a description of the country banks' opposition to such coercion in
its personal aspect, see Fariers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank
(1922, E. D. Ky.) 286 Fed. 61o; cf. Suffolk Bank v. Lincoln Bank (1821, C. C. D.
Me.) 3 Mason, I; Suffolk Bank v. Worcester Bank (1827) 22 Mass. lo6.
'The court makes the intent of the Federal Reserve Bank the criterion, and
holds that it may not harass the country bank in order to coerce it into doing
business with the Federal Reserve. This decision was followed in Farners' &
Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 8. An ordinarily lawful
YALE LAW JOURNAL
denied by the Reserve Bank and not sustained by the evidence, the
relief sought in this respect was denied.' 0 . But in denying the relief
the court stressed the point that the Reserve Bank had formally declared
itself willing to receive in payment of such items a draft of the drawee,
if solvent, on any other solvent bank. Certainly in that case the court
realized that compliance with the rule against taking payment of checks
in bank drafts was at least undesirable.'
Oddly enough another feature of the same struggle for par clearance
which exposed the obsolescence of the rule of the Malloy case may
carry within it the germs of a remedy. Before the state banks had won
their contention in the courts the legislatures of several agricultural
states came to their rescue by providing that drafts on these banks when-
ever presented by or through a Federal Reserve Bank might be paid in
exchange, and less exchange charges. 1 2  The constitutionality of the
North Carolina statute was sustained in Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of
Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (1923) 262 U. S. 649,
43 Sup. Ct. 651. So far as these statutes permit the payment of checks
in exchange drafts, they are to be unqualifiedly approved. They raise,
however, some questions as to the legal responsibility of banks which now
act may become actionable where it is performed for the sole purpose of inflicting
intentional injury. Tuttle v. Buck (19o9) 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946. But
where the ultimate object is not the injury but self-interest, this has been considered
a defense. Beardsley v. Kiliner (1923) 236 N. Y. 8o, 14o N. E. 2o3; (1922) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194. And even without that justification although we may
be accustomed to the idea that one cannot insist on his legal rights (privileges)
for the purpose of injuring another, it is a new notion that one cannot insist on
performing his legal duty with a bad motive. But see Carmen v. Fox Film Corp.
(ig2o, C. C. A. 2d) 269 Fed. 928. The force of the decision as a precedent is
weakened by the fact that it was based largely on the ground that the Federal
Reserve Bank jis not a private business but one the policy of which is ultimately
connected with the commercial policy of the United States.
"
0American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (1922,
C. C. A. 5th) 284 Fed. 424; on appeal (1923) 262 U. S. 643, 43 Sup. Ct. 649.
" In the Malloy case the 'defendant collecting bank also sent the check direct to
the drawee for payment. This is negligence as a matter of law. National Revere
Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, supra note i; Smith v. National Bank of
D. 0. Mills & Co., supra note I; National Bank of Counerce v. fohnson, supra
note 4. Even where the drawee is the only bank at the place of payment. Win-
chester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, supra note 4; contra where there is an
established custom: Waggoner Bank & Trust Co. v. Ganer Co. (1919, Tex.) 213
S. W. 927. Custom and usage are no excuse. Minneapolis Sash & Door Co. v.
Metropolitan Bank (1899) 76 Minn. 136, 78 N. W. 98o. For illustrations of the
unsuitability of the drawee to act as collecting agent for the holder see Planters
Mercantile Co. v. Armour Packing Co. (1915) 109 Miss. 470, 69 So. 293;
Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank (1917, C. C. A. 4th) 240 Fed.
303; Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1921,
D. Or.) 277 Fed. 43o. But in the Malloy case the defendant had succeeded in
contracting itself out of liability for this conduct. Cf. infra note 15.
' See Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 8, foot-
note 5, 262 U. S. at p. 658, 43 Sup. Ct. at p. 655 for collected statutes.
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receive such drafts in payment of commercial paper. As against a
principal who must be taken to know the disability'3 of his agent to
require cash, obviously it is no longer negligence not to collect cash.
It is equally clear that the agent would not be justified in receiving every
sort of draft offered by the drawee. Certainly it could not take a draft
which it knew to be worthless.' 4 But must it be free from negligence
in not knowing the draft to be worthless? Must it be reasonably certain
that the draft is good? If it were not for the rules of protest and notice,
the problem would be relatively simple. A check might be treated like
a promissory note without endorsers; a worthless draft given by the
drawee might be regarded as conditional payment, its dishonor leaving
the holder all his original rights against the drawer and other parties.
This rule might well be applied in cases where protest and notice had
been waived or in the rare cases in which the worthlessness of the
second draft, as, for instance, a check on another institution in the same
city, could be discovered in time to protest the first one. In deciding
cases which may arise under these statutes the law of bank collections
may be forced into line with banking practice. As a practical solution
of the problem, the Federal Reserve Banks will simply contract them-
selves out of all responsibility.15 They will merely add one more to
"
3However, a member bank is not required by the Federal Reserve Bank to put
a check through the Federal Reserve. Is it the duty of a bank receiving such
paper for collection to put it through some other channel by which it can collect
cash? Or, when the Federal Reserve is the speediest channel, does not the
member bank owe its depositor a duty of putting the check through that way?
"Indig v. National City Bank of Brooklyn (1880) 8o N. Y. I00; In re Johnson
(1894) 1O3 Mich. iog, 61 N. W. 352; Bellevue Bank v. Security National Bank,
supra note 4. And cf. Sanitary Can Co. v. National Pickle & Canning Co., supra
note 4, holding that where the collecting bank accepted a check drawn on itself
when it knew itself to be insolvent, the check was not paid, and the holder can
still sue the maker.
"Both the "New York" and the "Massachusetts" rules recognize that the
rule is a mere presumption to be applied only in the absence of a contract which
measures the extent of the bank's liability. Farmers' State Bank v. Union
National Bank of Minot (igig) 42 N. D. 449, 173 N. W. 789. Naturally banks
located in places where the "New York" rule obtains always seek to contract
themselves out of responsibility for the negligence of their sub-agents. McBride
v. Illinois National Bank (I91O, ist Dept.) 138 App. Div. 339, 121 N. Y. Supp.
jo41; Columbia Overseas Corporation v. Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1921, ist
Dept.) 198 App. Div. 699, 191 N. Y. Supp. 85. The first bank in the chain to
neglect to make such a contract is then the collection agent of the holder and is
responsible for the negligence of all subsequent banks, its sub-agents. McBride v.
Illinois National Bank (1914, Ist Dept.) 163 App. Div. 417, 148 N. Y. Supp. 654.
The contract need not be express. It may be implied from the transaction.
Columbia Overseas Corporation v. Banco Nacional Ultramarino, supra. Where
the holder suggested that the draft be forwarded to a certain bank, he is estopped
to deny that such bank was his agent. First National Bank v. Quinby (igio, Tex.
'Civ. App.) 131 S. W. 429. In the instant case the Federal Reserve Bank thought
that it had contracted itself out of liability for receiving drafts in payment.
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their already long list of exemptions from liability.16 And the member
banks will just as rapidly change the set of conditions upon which they
receive checks for collection.137 As to the original collecting bank's
ability to make such a contract with all of its principals, some interesting
problems of offer and acceptance arise, and it is probable that there are
occasional instances in which the bank could not shake off all liability.
8
But that portion of these statutes which purposes to obviate par
clearance by permitting the deduction of exchange charges was prompted
by a short-sighted policy. Exchange fees exacted for services which
are not rendered are a useless drain on commerce, a waste motion ;1'
but their elimination, generally conceded to be highly desirable, has
been most difficult to put into practice. Even member banks at first
refused to remit at par voluntarily and had to be required to do so.2"
Nor after Congress permitted to non-member banks the advantages of
collection through the Federal Reserve System, could these banks be
induced to give up their exchange charges.21  The Reserve Banks
determined to collect at par regardless of opposition or temporary
expense, as is illustrated by the American Bank & Trust Co. case.
Whenever the opposition persisted in remaining unconvinced, their
effort was effectively blocked. 22  At present attempts to achieve a uni-
o See Closter National Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1922,
C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. i3g.
" This can be and is done by adding to teir list of conditions "and such condi-
tions as the Federal Reserve Bank may from time to time impose."
'Where the conditions on which a bank agrees to accept checks for collection
are printed on its deposit book or slip, one who deposits checks with notice of
those conditions accepts the bank's offer exactly as made. See McBride v. Illinois
National Bank, supra note 15 (both cases). But where the depositor, for example,
sends in the check by mail and has had no opportunity from previous dealings or
otherwise to know the conditions, it is now the depositor who is making the offer;
and, on the principle that an offer must be accepted exactly as made, if the bank
accepts the offer by forwarding the check for collection, can it subsequently impose
conditions on its acceptance by sending a notice to the depositor? In view of the
fact that the bank has to act promptly in forwarding the check, it would seem only
fair that a depositor who gives the bank no opportunity to reject or qualify his
offer should be deemed to make his offer in accordance with the custom and usage
of the bank.
29 Exchange charges constitute a burden on turnover and are, therefore, ipso
facto a hindrance to commercial transactions. Furthermore eliminating the charge
in all cases means that no collection channel is cheaper and therefore more used
than another except the quickest; and the quickest is through the Federal Reserve.
This tends to centralize clearances and strengthen the Federal Reserve system-a
benefit in itself. See Willis, The Federal Reserve System (1923) o55.
" S-ee Willis, The Federal Reserve System, supra note i.
-For a history of the whole par clearance movement see the discussion by
Justice Brandeis in the Farmers' Bank case.
' They were enjoined from using coercion, and from publishing the names of
unwilling banks on their par lists. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal
Reserve Bank, supra note 7. They were enjoined from sending checks to the
drawee indorsed "pay without deduction for exchange," and on the refusal of the
drawee to pay such checks returning them to the holder as having been unpaid and
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versal par clearance system by coercion of unwilling banks have been
abandoned.23  The protest against the change, however, is that of the
unprotected. Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note ii.
They were enjoined from refusing to accept for collection checks stamped payable
in cash or exchange at drawee's option. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank, supra note 8. It has been pointed out that the fight has just
begun. NoTms (1923) 37 HARv. L. REV. 133, 135. The next move is hard to
predict. But see infra note 23.
2' The latest ruling of the Federal Reserve Board on the subject is that in order
to conform to the spirit as well as the letter of the recent Supreme Court decisions
the use of agents other than banks for the purpose of making collections at par will
be discontinued. Fed. Res. Bull. Nov. 1923, p. 1194. It has been advanced as
possible that coercion will now come from another quarter. If these checks are
held not to be negotiable under the N. I. L., depositors in such banks may exert
considerable pressure on the legislatures to repeal these statutes. See NOTES
(1923) 37 HYAv. L. Rv. 136, note 19, supra note 22.
The Negotiable Instruments Law stipulates that to be negotiable, paper must
be payable in money and for a sum certain. Sec. i. Checks payable with exchange
are expressly exempted and are negotiable. First National Bank of Mankato v.
Carey (1922) I53 Minn. 246, I9o N. W. 182. Before the N. I. L. such paper was
generally held non-negotiable. Carroll County Savings Bank v. Strather (I888)
28 S. C. 504, 6 S. E. 313; Culbertson v. Nelson (895) 93 Iowa, 187, 61 N. W.
854. Checks payable in current funds are generally held to be payable in money
and therefore negotiable. Bull v. First National Bank (1887) 123 U. S. 1O5, 8
Sup. Ct. 62; McCormick v. Kampmamn (1go8, Tex. Civ. App.) 1o9 S' W. 492;
Tiedeman, Law of Conmercial Paper (1889) 71. This is sound because our
present money policy is founded on the fact of currency rather than tenderability.
Oliphant, Money in Cominercial Instruments (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6o6.
But see Perkins, May a Promissory Note Be Payable in Foreign Money? (192o)
5 IowA L. BULL. 209. Instruments payable in exchange have generally been held
non-negotiable on the ground not that the holder cannot demand payment in
money but that the maker cannot discharge his obligation except by means of
exchange. First National Bank of Brooklyn v. Slette (1897) 67 Minn. 425, 69
N. W. 1148; Chandler v. Calvert (igoI) 87 Mo. App. 368. There is a modem
tendency to hold such paper negotiable on the ground that the words "in exchange"
merely provide the method of carrying payment, and that most commercial paper is
in fact paid in this way. Security Trust Co. v. Des Moines County (1gog, S. D.
Iowa) 198 Fed. 331. Cf. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank,
supra note 8. But the instruments here involved are different. They are not
stamped payable in exchange. By the statute they are merely uncollectible in
money through the Federal Reserve Banks. The holder of the check himself or
acting through any other agent can demand cash. If he gives it to a member of
the Federal Reserve System to collect, he waives payment in cash. Is not this
situation the exact converse of that created by the indorsement "pay to any bank
or banker" in jurisdictions where such an indorsement is held to be non-restric-
tive? Restrictive: Citizens' Trust Co. v. Ward (1916) 195 Mo. App. 223, 19o
S. W. 364; Johnston v. Schnabaum (19o8) 86 Ark. 82, 1O9 S. W. 1163; Trades-
men's State Bank v. Fort Worth Elevator Co. (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W.
656. Unrestrictive: First National Bank v. City National Bank (1902) 182 Mass.
13o, 65 N. E. 24; National Bank v. Bossemeyer (1917) IOI Neb. 96, 162 N. W.
503; Interstate Trust Co. v. United States National Bank (1919) 67 Colo. 6, 185
Pac. 260. See IO A. L. R_ 709, note. There the instrument is negotiable only
through the specified channel; here it is negotiable except through the specified
channel. True the exception almost swallows up the rule. But it is submitted that
such checks are negotiable.
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subliminal competitor always loudly voiced on the introduction of new,
more efficient conditions. If it is true, as the objectors insist, that they
cannot exist without their unearned profits, then at least they should be
recognized as parasitic and maintained as such.
The building up of a smooth efficient system of commercial transfers
and clearances has been one of the most valuable contributions of the
Federal Reserve. The decision in the Malloy case will not induce a
return to clumsy expensive methods of transferring funds. Nor will
the decision in the Farmers' Bank case permanently deter par clearance.
Universal par clearance is essential to efficiency and it is not likely that
the Federal Reserve Banks will be satisfied with an incomplete system.
2
THE SALE OF GERMAN OWNED PATENTS UNDER THE TRADING WITH THE
ENEMY ACT AS AMENDED
On April io, 1919 and on various later dates, the Alien Property
Custodian sold some 4,5oo German owned patents to the Chemical
Foundation, Inc., for about $250,000. In 1922 the United States filed
its bill in equity to have the sale set aside and the patents returned to
the Alien Property Custodian on the ground that the sale was void
for conspiracy, fraud and violation of law. The court in United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc. (1924, D. Del.) 294 Fed. 3oo,
dismissed the Government's bill.
The Trading with the Enemy Act" provided infer ala that enemy prop-
erty could be taken over by the President and entrusted to the Alien
Property Custodian. Property could be sold "to prevent waste" but
the proceeds were to be preserved. Sec. 5 (a) provided that "The
President may exercise any authority conferred by this Act through
such officer or officers as he shall direct." Under this section the
President from time to time authorized the Custodian to carry out
the terms of the Act, usually stating that he vested in him "the execu-
tive administration" of certain sections.2 The Supreme Court upheld
the delegation of even what seemed to be highly discretionary powers.
8
On March 28, i918 the Act was amended, permitting sales of enemy
property at public sale "unless the President, stating the reasons there-
" Besides, it is unfair to allow non-member banks to make exchange charges
when they themselves can collect the full face value of checks drawn on member
banks. See Farmer' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank (1922) 184
N. C. 546, 112 S. E. 252.
'Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 411).
'The Executive Orders are collected in Appendix 8 of the Alien Property
Custodian Report (I919), at pp. 499 fif.
'Central Union. Trust Co. v. Garvan (1921) 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. '214;
Stoehr v. Wallace (1921) 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct 293.
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for, in the public interest shall otherwise determine."4  On several
occasions the President authorized sales in the public interest.5
On November 4, 1918 another amendment 6 authorized the sale of
enemy patents and trademarks. On December 3, 1918, the President
by executive order7 undertook to vest in Frank L. Polk, then Counselor
of the State Department, "all power and authority conferred upon
the President by the provisions of Sec. 12. .... as amended." Mr.
Polk, on February 26, i919, under authority of this order, authorized8
the private sale of patents to the Chemical Foundation. The sale had
originally been planned by Mr. Palmer as Custodian. On March 4,
i919, Mr. Garvan succeeded to the office of Custodian and on March
8th he became president of the Chemical Foundation, Inc., a corporation
organized to purchase this property and administer it for the public
interest. On April io, i919, he, as Custodian, made the sale to the
Foundation. The other officers of the Foundation, its directors, and
the voting trustees of the stock were all connected with the Custodian's
office.9 The sale was made after the Armistice had ended hostilities,
although in the view of our national law a state of war still technically
existed.
In its effort to prove conspiracy and fraud, reliance was placed by
the Government upon the fact that the capital stock had been subscribed
by large business interests which presumably would profit after the
war by destroying the German control of the patent rights. Inade-
quacy of consideration was also averred. The substantial identity
of the vendor and vendee was an alleged ground of suspicion, espe-
cially in view of the rules for sales by the Custodian, as laid down
4 40 Stat, at L. 459.
' The orders for these sales were usually made in specific and not in general
terms. See, e. g. Custodian Report at pp. 519 ff. But see Executive Order No.
2949, ibid. 535.
840 Stat. at L. 102o.
'No. 3oi6, Par. V
"By order of February 26, 1919, Custodian Report, supra note 2, at p. 549.
'The charter of the Foundation states its purpose to be to hold the property
acquired "in a fiduciary capacity for the Americanization of such industries as
may be affected thereby, for the exclusion or elimination of alien interests ....
and for the advancement of chemical and allied science and industry in the
United States." The Corporation may "grant non-exclusive licenses .... upon
such terms as the board of directors may determine," and the directors also have
the power to refuse to issue or to revoke any such license. The dividends on
the preferred and common stock are limited to 6%. The Vice President and the
Secretary-Treasurer of the Foundation represented the Custodian on various
boards of directors of companies under the Custodian's control. The President
(Mr. Garvan) and these two officers constituted the Board of Directors. The
capital stock of $5ooooo was subscribed by various chemical, dye, steel and
other manufacturing companies, and all the stock was assigned to a voting trust
whose trustees were'the members of the Custodian's Advisory Sales Committee.
The purpose of the Foundation is set forth in the court's opinion at p. 327 and
in the Custodian Report at p. 6o.
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June 6, 1918, by the previous Custodian, Mr. Palmer, who arranged
the sale, providing that "under no circumstances will any person in the
employ or connected with the organization of the Alien Property Custo-
dian be permitted to .... purchase any property or be interested directly
or indirectly in any such purchase or in any corporation or syndicate
interested therein."10  But presumably, such an administrative rule
could be revoked or altered at the pleasure of the Custodian. The court
found that fraud and conspiracy were not proved.
The Government further maintained that the acts of Congress did
not authorize such a sale, first, because it was confiscatory and Congress
did not contemplate confiscation of enemy property; and second, because
the power to sell was not validly exercised. On the question whether
the sale was in fact confiscatory it was conceded that the sale price was
far less than the property was worth to the Germans from whom it
was seized and that the "conditions of sale were partially destructive
of the selling value even to American citizens."'1  Since the Trading
with the Enemy Act as amended provides that the sole remedy of any
claimant in the event of a sale of his property by the Custodian shall
be limited to the net proceeds received therefrom, 2 it is apparent from
the German viewpoint that this property was in effect confiscated. But
the court found that many of the patents were without substantial
affirmative value to American citizens.' 3 The court invokes 4 those
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles whereby Germany undertook
to compensate her nationals in respect of their property sold by the
Allies. It is believed that this provision is not now applicable to the
United States;"5 yet even if it were, the fact of confiscation is not
altered because Germany has agreed to bear the liability for confiscatory
acts.
If this sale was equivalent to confiscation, as the court seems to
admit, the question then arises whether Congress authorized confis-
cation. The court argues 6 that the act authorizes private sales in the
public interest; that "public interest is not a synohym for money";
that the act authorizes a sale to American citizens; that no sale could
be made to Americans for full "German" value and that therefore a
sale'for less than that value was contemplated. It also lays considerable
stress on the fact that the amendment of March, i918, authorizing
the sale of enemy property "was passed during the darkest days of
the war" and reaches the conclusion that at this time Congress intended
Custodian Report at p. 209.
:294 Fed. at p. 3o3.
'Amendment of November 4, I918 (4o Stat. at L. 1020, 1021).
13 294 Fed. at p. 317.
"Ibid. 319.
" See Yntema, The Treaties with Germany and Compensation for War Dainage
(I923Y 23 COL. L. R. 511, 523.
"At Pp. 307, 317.
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to "subordinate mere property rights to the welfare of the nation,"
although the original statute was "purely a conservation act." This
interpretation of the Amendment seems not to agree with that of
Attorney-General Palmer, who, as Alien Property Custodian, arranged
the sale in question and who said that "it was the intention of Congress
that any disposition by sale. . . . should be only at a substantial and
fair consideration"; that a German patent could not be sold to the War
Department "for a merely nominal consideration, but must require
the payment of an amount which fairly represents the value of the
property."' 7 In the same opinion Mr. Palmer stated that "the possibil-
ity of suits for infringement and attacks on title should not be con-
sidered in computing the fair value of the patent." Nor does Congress
seem to have contemplated confiscation. The extent to which a court
may refer to the proceedings of the legislature to discover the legis-
lative intent is not wholly clear, but it is believed that such reference
as the courts indulge in would establish the above fact. Remarks of
the senator in charge of the bill indicate this.18 As a rule of statutory
construction such remarks are more favored than debates or speeches
of other members.1 9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
if possible a statute should not be construed to violate international
( 919) 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 463.
"See infra notes 28 and 30.
"In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (x897) 166 U. S. 290,
318, 17 Sup. Ct. 54o, 55o, the Supreme Court said that debates and reports
of Congress are not "appropriate sources of information from which to
discover the meaning of the language of a statute." In Omaha & C. B. S.
Ry. v. Interstate C. C. (1913) 230 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 89o, the Court refused
to consider the remarks of the author of the bill and chairman of the Senate
committee to which it had been referred. In Lapina v. Williams (1914) 232
U. S. 78, 34 Sup. Ct. 196, the court looked at the reports of the committees but
not at the debates. In Caminetti v. United States (1917) 242 U. S. 470, 490,
37 Sup. Ct 192, 196, the court said "Reports to Congress accompanying the intro-
duction of proposed laws may aid the courts in reaching the true meaning of the
legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation." In Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 474, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 179, the court again rejected
debates but said "Reports 'of committees .... stand upon a more solid footing
and may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative, intent .... and this
has been extended to include explanatory statements in the nature of a supple-
mental report made by the committee member in charge of a bill in course of
passage." This position was reaffirmed in Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. C. B. &
Q. R. R. (1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232. A loophole for the consideration
of debates is left by statements in two decisions. In United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association, supra, the court said (at p. 318, 17 Sup. Ct. at
p. 550) the intent might be discovered by a resort to the history of the times
when it was passed. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. I,
31 Sup. Ct. 502, the court resorted to the debates "as a means of ascertain-
ing .... the history of the period when it was adopted." See NoTms (1899)
13 HmAv. L. REV. 52; see a book review by Frederic P. Lee in (1924) 24 Coi L.
REV. 214.
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law.20  That international law forbids the confiscation of private
enemy property has, it is believed, already been shown in this JOURNAL.21
The court in reaching an opposite conclusion attributed to various
dicta of the Supreme Court the force of decisions. The issue has
never been squarely presented to our highest tribunal, because the
United States has never adopted a policy of confiscation; there is
therefore no decision which can bind the lower courts who should
look elsewhere for the rule of international law.22  The dicta in the
two famous early cases of Ware v. Hylton2 and Brown v. United
States2 4 were uttefed over a century ago when the present rule of inter-
national law was in its infancy. If one goes back far enough one can
also find abundant authority for the privilege of enslaving women and
of dragging captives through the streets behind the triumphant general's
limousine. Chief Justice Marshall shows that in 1814 he realized that
the rule was changing. 5  The court also relies on the Civil WArar cases.2 6
At that time confiscation was authorized by Congress to punish person-
ally certain rebellious citizens of the United States. No doubt the
Supreme Court in those cases used broad language, but the decisions
cannot be cited in support of the general proposition for which the court
here invoked them. Two cases arising out of the Spanish war were also
cited but these dealt with the seizure of property in enemy territory
for the immediate needs of the army-an entirely different problem
as the Supreme Court realized, although broad dicta are again
available.2 7  The court, it is believed, approached this problem from
"See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (1804, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 64, 118.
nSee COMMENTS (igig) 28 YAia LAW JOUsRNAL, 478; ibid. 499; (1922) 31
ibid. 435; (1923) 32 ibid. 405; also NoTEs (1923) 23 CoL L. REV. 383; and in
general, Hays, Enemy Property in America (1923); Smith, Return of German4
roperty (1922). The classic exposition of this view is that of John Bassett
Moore in 7 Moore's Digest (29o6) 31o. The opposite view is expounded by
Mullins, Private Enemy Property (1923) VIII GRoTrus SocY, 89; Harriman,
Confiscation of Enemy Private Property (1923) 3 BOSTON U. L. REv. 156.
The Supreme Court has indicated the sources of international law in The
Paquete Habana (igoo) 175 U. S. 677, 700, 20 Sup. Ct 290, 299.
(I796) 3 Dall. i99.
" (1814) 8 Cranch, iio.
"In the Brown case he pointed out that the modern usage was not to confiscate
private property and that "this usage .... cannot be disregarded without
obloquy." Twenty years later in United States v. Percheman (1833, U. S.)
7 Pet. 5I, 86, Marshall said, "The modern usage of nations, which has become
law, would be violated .... if private property should be generally confiscated."
It has been suggested that this latter dictum referred to property acquired by
conquest or cession, but it is believed that Mr. Moore is correct in interpreting
it as Marshall's final opinion on the general subject in question. See Moore,
op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 323.
"Miller v. United States (187o, U. S.) ii Wall. 268; Kirk v. Lynd (1882) io6
U. S. 315, I Sup. Ct. 296. See NoTEs (1923) 23 Cor. L. REV. 383; 2 Hyde,
International Law (I922) 238.
'Juragua Iron Co. v. United States (19og) 212 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 385;
Herrera v. United States (2922) 222 U. S. 558, 32 Sup. Ct. 179.
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a wrong angle in deeming the Trading with the Enemy Act to be an
exercise of the Congressional power to "make rules concerning cap-
tures on land." This sequestration of enemy property was in the
court's own language "purely a conservation act." It was passed to
protect and preserve enemy property, not to seize it with that hostile
intent which is a necessary concomitant of a capture.18 And it will
be recalled that the sale of patents was made after hostilities ceased, a
fact negativing the idea of. "capture."
The Government's second contention was that even if the sale was
authorized, the power to sell was not validly exercised. It was argued
that sec. 5 of the original act authorizing delegation of the President's
power did not apply to the Amendment of March 28, which authorized
private sales when the President considered it necessary in the public
interest. The court without argument held that sec. 5 applied to the
Amendment.29 But reference to the Congressional Record indicates
that the legislative intent was that the President should personally
determine the necessity of private sale - his personal judgment was
relied on. 0 If this section does not so apply, it seems that this power
See Smith, op. cit. supra note 21, at pp. 33 ff for full quotations from the
Congressional Record on the purpose of the Act. The change in "purpose"
evidenced by the execution of the act seems to be due to the policy of Mr.
Palmer and not of Congress. In his Report, at p. 14, Mr. Palmer says, "The
original trading-with-the-enemy act made the Alien Property Custodian a mere
conservator"; and" at p. 15, "Instead of permitting myself to become a mere
conservator of enemy property, I have tried to make the trading-with-the-enemy
act a fighting force in the war." The question of "capture" will be treated in
John Bassett Moore's new book, International Law and Some Current Illusions,
soon to be published.
"294 Fed. at p. 325. The same decision was reached In re Miller (1922,
C. C. A. 2d) 281 Fed. 764.
"The Amendment of March 28th as first introduced in the Senate. provided
for sale without any qualifications. Senator Frelinghuysen's motion to amend
to require sale at public auction was carried. (1918) 56 Cong. Rec. 65th Con-
gress, ist Sess. at p. 3598. The bill was sent to Conference of the two Houses
and was reported out to the Senate on March 23 by Senator Underwood, a.
member of the Conference Committee. He stated that the Frelinghuysen amend-
ment had been slightly changed. Senator Gallinger inquired why the President
might order a non-public sale. Senator Underwood replied (loc. cit. 4231) "The
only modification in that respect is that it does not leave everything to the
Alien Property Custodian. The proposed change is 'when the President shall
determine' not 'prescribe.' As I understand when we provide that the President
shall 'prescribe' he may make rules and regulations, but the change is that 'when
the President shall determine,' which will require the personal act of the Presi-
dent .... Now, this merely gives the right to the Alien Property Custodian
in an exceptional case to appeal to the President to allow a certain portion of
such property to be sold not by public auction but by negotiation. Then the
President must indicate in writing why he has done so." On March 25 the
debates were continued and in the course of the discussion Senator Frelinghuysen
says that the property should be sold for an adequate consideration. Senator
Underwood replied (lec. cit. 4311), "The personal action of the President is
required to accomplish that result, and he is required to .give in writing his
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which the President intended to vest in Mr. Polk was of that discre-
tionary nature which forbids delegation.31  There was no little conten-
tion as to the extent, effect, and validity of the President's ratification of
1920. The court accepts it without discussion. 2  It is impossible
to discuss the many other interesting points both of law and of fact
which are raised by this case. To the layman, influenced by the Teapot
Dome exposure, and perhaps by an instinctive distrust of any sales
of very valuable property by government officials to private corpora-
tions the sale of these patents under all the circumstances may seem
questionable.
Without endeavoring to pass judgment upon the voluminous evidence
this discussion is intended merely to suggest some of the problems.
and to indicate certain errors in law which it is believed are revealed in
the District Court's decision.
The Circuit Court of Appeals 3 and the Supreme Court of the United
States will probably have an opportunity to settle these points.
reasons for doing so. . . . If the President of the United States, acting himself
and not through an agent, determines that it is necessary to be done, and in writ-
ing gives his reasons for doing so, it seems to me that it is ample protection to
the public and to the property." The above statements coming from Mr. Under-
wood, the Committee member in charge of the bill, in the light of the statement
of the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, quoted supra
note i, would seem to indicate that the court should find that the legislative
intent was that this power was not to be delegated. If sec. 5 applies to this
amendment the President could have delegated the power to determine the
necessity for a private sale to the Custodian, a contingency which, as Senator
Underwood states expressly, the bill was framed to avoid.
'It is a general principle that if a power reposes a personal trust and confi-
dence in the donee, to exercise his own judgment and discretion, he cannot refer
the power to the execution of another. Sugden, Powers (1861) 179; Mechem,
Public Offices and Officers (i8go) sec. 567; Martin v. Mott (1827, U. S.) 12
Wheat. ig; Coquard v,. Chariton Co. (1882, C. C. W. D. Mo.) 14 Fed. 203.
Thus it has been held that the President's judicial power of reviewing court
martial sentences cannot be delegated. Runkle v. United States (1887) 122 U. S.
543, 7 Sup. Ct. 1141; United States v. Page (1891) 137 U. S. 673, I1 Sup. Ct.
219; nor his power of appointment, (1911) 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 116. But this does
not mean the President cannot act through subordinates; it is physically impossi-
ble for him to perform personally. every act, such as signing all orders of all
executive departments. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States (1923) 261 U. S.
514, 43 Sup. Ct. 428; Williams v. United States (1843, U. S.) i How. 290;
Lockington v. Smith (1i1, C. C. 3d) I Pet. C. C. 466; (,877) 15 Op. Atty. Gen.
290; (1855) 7 ibid. 453; (1828) 2 ibid. 67. These principles are illustrated by
the executive orders under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Assuming that
sec. 5 does not apply, the vesting of "executive administration" in the Custodian
is permissible under the principle that the president may carry out his determina-
tions through subordinates, but the attempt to "vest all Dower and authority" in
Mr. Polk goes further and seems to be a forbidden delegation of discretionary
powers.
"294 Fed. at p. 326.
1 The case has already been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals at Philadel-
phia. NEW YORx TIMES, March 27, 1924, 7: 2.
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PRIORITY AMONG ASSIGNEES OF A CHOSE IN ACTION
In the leading case of Dearle v. Hall' the English courts early
established the rule later broadened to cover all assignments of choses
in action that a subsequent assignee of a cestuifs interest who inquired
of the trustee and gave him notice of his assignment was entitled to
priority over a former assignee who failed to give such notice. This
doctrine was based on the analogy to the sale of chattels to a later
vendee by a vendor who has been allowed to remaifi in possession,2
and also on the theory that it was the only way to protect against the
fraud of the assignor.3 A few years later the requirement of inquiry
was eliminated,4 and prior notice to the debtor alone was held sufficient.
This is the present so-called English doctrine.5 The rule does not apply
to assignments of equitable interests in land,8 or to cases where recorda-
tion of assignments is provided for.7 Nor can the second assignee
recover unless he is a purchaser for values and without notice of the
(823, Ch.) 3 Russ. i. For a similar decision, see Loveridge v. Cooper (1823,
Ch.) 3 Russ. 3o. These cases involved successive assignments by a cestui of his
interest in a trust estate. The doctrine was approved by the House of Lords in
Foster v. Cockerell (1835, H. L.) 3 Cl. & F. 456.
' See Dearle v. Hall, supra note I, at p. 23. In discussing this basis of the rule,
Pomeroy in 2 Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed. 19o5) sec. 695, says, "This course
of reasoning is, as it seems to me, completely unanswerable; the special rule
concerning notice results from it as an irresistible conclusion. No other rule
within the entire range of equity jurisprudence rests on a more solid foundation
of argument, or is more intrinsically just and reasonable." This reasoning seems
inapplicable, however, in those states where retention of possession by the vendor
is only presumptive evidence of fraud which may be rebutted. See Meier v. Hess
(1893) 23 Or. 599, 32 Pac. 755. However under the present Sales Act, a second
vendee who relying on this retention of possession purchases for value and
obtains delivery is protected. Sales Act, sec. 25; infra note 21.
'This has been the ground chiefly relied on by the courts following Dearie v.
Hall. See fenkinson v. N. Y. Finance Co. (91) 79 N. J. Eq. 247, 26o, 82 Atl.
36, 43.4 Meux v. Bell (1841, Ch.) i Hare, 73. "The omission of the puisne encum-
brancer to make inquiry cannot be material where inquiry into the circumstances
of the case would not have led to a knowledge of the prior encumbrance."
Ibid. 86.
'Re Dallas [1904] 2 Ch. 385; Re Lake [19o3] i K. B. 151. See Ward v. Dun-
combe [1893, H. L.] A. C. 369; Judicature Act (1873) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, sec. 25,
subsec. 6.
'Girard Trust Co. v. Tobias (igoi, C. P.) 13 Pa. Dist. 5 1f; Wilmot v. Pike
(1845, Ch.) 5 Hare, 13.
Where the recording statutes provide for the recordation of equitable assign-
ments, the one who first records his assignment prevails. Peabody v. Lewiston
(i8g) 83 Me. 286, 22 Atl. 171 (wages) ; Montague v. Aygarn (1911) 164 111.
App. 596 (contract relating to an interest in land). But such recording acts are
strictly construed. Kuhnes v. Cahill (i9o5) 128 Iowa, 594, 1O4 N. W. 1025.
'A mere gratuitous assignment or assignment in consideration of an antecedent
debt is not sufficient. Davis v. State National Bank (1913, Tex. Civ. App.) 156
S. W. 321; The Elinbank (1896, N. D. Calif.) 72 Fed. 61o; but see contra:
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prior assignment. 9 Other courts, however, refused to adopt this doc-
trine, and applied the general rule that between equal equities, the one
prior in time prevails regardless of notice. The basis of this latter
rule is often said to be that the assignor has conveyed all his "title"
to the first assignee and has nothing left to convey to the second,' 0
and that notice is not necessary to consummate the right of the first
assignee."- Even under this theory if the second assignee obtains
payment from the debtor,12 or effects a novation with the debtor, 3 or
reduces his claim to a judgment, 14 he prevails over the first assignee.' 5
Manufacturers' Coin. Co. v. Rock. R. R. (igog, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 117 N. Y.
Supp. 989. Ordinarily the first assignee will also prevail over a subsequent
attaching or garnishing creditor who first gives notice. Third National Bank v.
Atlantic City (19o3, C. C. D. N. J.) 126 Fed. 413; Steltzer v. Condon (19o8) 139
Iowa, 754, 1i8 N. W. 39; but see Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1841)
14 Conn. 14o; Dillingham v. Ins. Co. (19o7) I2O Tenn. 32, io8 S. W. 1148.
A creditor assignee is held to be in the same position as an assignee for value.
In re Furnace Co. (1916, E. D. Pa.) 233 Fed. 451. Likewise an assignee in
bankruptcy. Laclede Bank v. Schuler (1887) 120 U. S. 511, 7 Sup. Ct. 644.
'Heins v. Wicke (1897) 102 Iowa, 396, 71 N. W. 345; Powell v. Powell (igog)
217 Mo. 571, 117 S. W. I13. As to the burden of proof on this question there
seems to be a conflict. Wagenhurst v. Wineland (1902) 20 App. D. C. 85 (on
subsequent assignee); Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, 188 S. W. 1144
(on prior assignee).
0"The rule of caveat emptor applies to sales of choses in action as in other
sales of personal property, and if the seller has sold the thing to one person, and
therefore has no title to pass to a second, the latter takes nothing by his pur-
chase." Columbia Finance Co. v. First National Bank (1903) 116 Ky. 364, 375,
76 S. W. 156, 158. "Title" to a "chose in action" is nothing but the right itself.
After an assignment it is true that the assignor has no right left; but it does
not necessarily follow from this that he should not still have a power of discharge
and a power to create a right in a second assignee.
' No notice to the debtor is necessary as between assignor and assignee.
Quigley v. Welter (9o5) 95 Minn. 383, 104 N. W. 236. But unless such notice
is given, the debtor may discharge his liability by paying the assignor or a subse-
quent assignee. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 694. Commonwealth v. Sides
(1896) 176 Pa. 616, 35 Atl. 136; Foster v. Carson (1894) 159 Pa. 477, 28 Atl. 356.
'Bridge v. Coin. Co. (I89o) 152 Mass. 343, 25 N. E. 612; Rabinowitz v.
People's National'Bank (1920) 235 Mass. 1O2, 126 N. E. 289.
N . Y. N. H. & H. R. R. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y.- 30; Strange v. Houston
Ry. Co. (i88o) 53 Tex. 162.
"Judson v. Corcoran (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 612.
'It is often said that the second assignee will be preferred if he has obtained
a "legal title." "The equities being equal, the law must prevail." See Coffiman
v. Liggett's Adm'r (907) 107 Va. 418, 59 S. E. 392, saying that "here Corcoran
has drawn to his equity a legal title to the fund." This illustrates the lack of
accurate analysis customary in assignment cases. There was no "fund" to which
any kind of title existed. There was an insurance policy, which as a physical
document is the subject of a property interest. There was also the contract
right to payment'in personain, subject to the conditions stated in the policy. It is
this right to payment that is in litigation. According to the combined law-
equity system that exists to-day, this right can be assigned either with or without
the policy itself. This was not true at early common law. The possession of the
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And the first assignee may by his conduct be estopped from claiming
priority.'6 In the United States the authorities are almost evenly
divided between the two views." The United States Supreme Court
has recently in the case of Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance
Co. (1924) 44 Sup. Ct. 266,18 definitely adopted 9 the rule preferring
the first assignee.
policy should be material only in determining whether or not the "equities" are.
in fact equal and whether or not there is an estoppel as against the first assignee.
Thq second assignee should prevail not because he has "legal title" to the docu-
ment, but because he has the stronger "equity." See Spain v. Hamilton's Adrn'r
(1863, U. S.) i Wall. 604; Weeks v. New York (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 42 Misc.
436, 87 N. Y. Supp. 98.
" Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke (1899) 124 Calif. 117, 56 Pac. 627; Security
Co. v. Delfs (192o) 47 Calif. App. 599, 191 Pac. 53; Herman v. Conn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. (1914) 218 Mass. 181, 105 N. E. 450.
" The federal courts have adopted the English view. In re Roebling (1895,
C. C. A. 2d) 66 Fed. 113; In re Leterinan Becher & Co. (C. C. A. 2d) 26o Fed.
543; Salem Trust Co. v. Mfrs' Finance Co. (i922, C. C. A. Ist) 28o Fed. 803.
The following state courts also are in accord: Adamson v. Paonessa (I919) i8o
Calif. 157, 179 Pac. 88o; Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note 8;
National Bank v. Ins. & Trust Co. of Pennsylvania (igoo) 17 App. D. C. 112;
Lambert v. Morgan (1909) i1O Md. I, 72 At. 407; First National Bank of
Aberdeen v. Monroe County (1923, Miss.) 95 So. 726; Houser v. Richardson(igoi) go Mo. App. 134; Jenkinson v. New York Finance Co., supra note 3;
Citizens' National Bank v. Mitchell (199o) 24 Okla. 488, IO3 Pac. 720; In re
Phillips (19o3) 205 Pa. 515, 55 AtI. 212; Peters v. Goetz, supra note 9; see
Coffman v. Liggett's Ad-n'r, supra note 15. Contra, Hawk v. Aiment (1888) 28
Ill. App. 390; Franze v. Stock Yards Co. (1917) 205 Ill. App. 313; White v.
Wiley (186o) 14 Ind. 496; Col. Finance & Trust Co. v. First National Bank
(19o3) 116 Ky. 364, 76 S. W. 156; Putntam v. Story (1882) 132 Mass. 205;
MacDonald v. Kneeland (186) 5 Minn. 352; Lindsay v. Wilson (1838) 22 N. C.
85; Fortunato v. Patten (1895) 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572; Meier v. Hess,
supra note 2; Hess & Skinner Eng. Co. v. Turney (ii) 1IO Tex. 148, 216
S. W. 621; Stebbins v. Fire Ins. Co. (1921) 115 Wash. 623, 197 Pac. 913; see
Turk v. Skiles (1898) 45 W. Va. 82, 30 S. E. 234.
Scotland follows the English rule. Redfearn z. Ferrier (1813, H. L.) t Dow.
5o. For the rule in France and Germany, see (89) 4 HARV. L. REv. 309, note 2.
Under the conflict of laws rule, where the assignment is made in one country,
and the debtor resides in another, it is the law of the latter country which controls.
In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [1891] i Ch. 536; see NoTEs (19o7)
20 HARv. L. IEv. 637; ibid. 9o7.
'The facts of the case are as follows: In May 1919, the Nelson Company
assigned to the petitioner for value a debt due to the Nelson Company under a
certain contract, to the amount of $45,ooo. In June it assigned the same debt
to the defendants to the amount of $40,000, and in September to the amount of
$io,ooo. The defendants did not inquire of the debtor, and took without notice
of the prior assignment. They notified the debtor of their assignment before the
petitioner. The Nelson Company having gone bankrupt, it was held that as
between the petitioner and the defendant, the petitioner whose assignment was-
prior in time prevailed.
" Until the principal case it was thought that the Supreme Court approved the
English rule. See Judson v. Corcoran, supra note 14; Spain v. Hamilton's
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In conveyances or mortgages of land,20 recording statutes protect
the rights of the subsequent bona fide grantee or mortgagee who first
records his deed. In the sale of chattels, where the vendee allows the
vendor to retain possessiori, a subsequent innocent purchaser from the
seller who obtains delivery gets good title.2' Likewise-where a document
evidencing a chose in action is left in the hands of the assignor, the
first assignee is defeated as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for
-value.22 Whether the same protection should be extended to the pur-
chaser, of a chose in action which is not evidenced by a document
capable either of recordation or possession is essentially a question of
policy. Is it desirable to promote freedom of transfer of choses in
action? The growth and expansion of business requires that the turn-
over of all property used in commercial transactions be facilitated.
That the tendency of the law has been to recognize this is evidence by
the increasing protection granted to innocent purchasers for value.
Courts adopting the English view have frankly based their decisions
on the desirability of something analogous to a recording system for
transfers of choses in action. Inquiry of one who is making a second
assignment will always be useless. Protection to a second assignee
can only be afforded by prompt notice to the debtor.23  The second
assignee relies on his apparently perfect assignment and forbears to
enforce payment of the debt, or to proceed against his assignor who
may later becone insolvent. To require that a purchaser immediately
exact payment, or obtain a judgment, or effect a novation in order
to protect himself against a possible prior assignee imposes too great
a burden on him. But if protection is afforded merely by prompt
notice a purchaser will not only be more apt to buy, but to give greater
Adm'r, supra note 15; Laclede Bank v. Schuler, supra note 8. While these cases
may be otherwise distinguished, the court in a strong dictum said, "This case
has been examined by us very fully.... We think it to be clearly within the
principles decided by this court in Judson v. Corcoran. It is clearly within the
cases so fully and ably reported of Dearle v. Hall and Loveridge v. Cooper....
As the assignee is generally entitled to all the remedies of the assignor so he is
subject to all the equities between the assignor and his debtor. But in order to
perfect his title against the debtor, it is indispensable that the assignee should
immediately give notice of the assignment to the debtor, for otherwise a priority
of right may be obtained by a subsequent assignee, or the debt may be discharged
by a payment to the assignee before such notice." Spain v. Hamilton's Adm'r,
supra at p. 623.
"Cooke v. Kell (1858) 13 Md. 469; Morse v. Curtis (1885) 140 Mass. i2, 2
N. E. 929; Fullerton v. Provincial Bank of Ireland [19o3, H. L.] A. C. 309.
'See Sales Act, sec. 25; Lanfear v. Sumner (i821) 17 Mass. 1io; and see
supra note 2.
'Bridge v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (i89o) 152 Mass. 343, 25 N. E. 62
(insurance policy); Kamena v. Huelbig '(1872) 23 N. J. Eq. 78 (bond). See
supra note 15.
'For a discussion of the manner of notice and the person to be notified, see
Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d ed. 1893) 328, note.
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value.2 4  It seems then that the English doctrine better carries out
any policy of promoting safe and rapid commercial intercourse.
Indeed, any rule which affords convenient machinery to prevent fraud
has every presumption in its favor.2 5
THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS TO DETERMINE THE CREDIBILITY
OF WITNESSES
The bases of many of our rules of evidence may be found in observa-
tions of human behavior,1 however imperfectly made, insufficiently
recorded and inaccurately generalized they may have been. The
common law disqualifications for infancy, infamy, and interest, partially
at least, are attributable to observed human conduct. The permissible
inference of guilt from flight; the trustworthiness attached to the
hearsay exceptions, especially those involving admissions by silence,
declarations against interest, and dying declarations, have some behavior-
istic justification. And the admissibility of evidence that the accused
refused to undergo a superstitious test, such as touching the corpse of
the slain, is sustained because of belief in its efficacy.2  So a witness
may testify that a person was intoxicated, angry, nervous, or in anguish,
even though he did not observe the phenomena which induced the intoxi-
cation, anger, nervousness, or fear.
Jurymen are often allowed to apply their own observations of human
conduct in weighing evidence. They may consider the effect of intoxi-
cation upon human behavior.8 They are accustomed, often uncon-
sciously, to consider such behavioristic traits as blushing, squinting of
the eyes, twitching, squirming, throat pulsations, verbosity, and avoid-
ance of the eyes of the examiner.4 Expert testimony as to the effect
See enkinson v. N. Y. Finance Co., supra note 3, at p. 43.
For a general discussion of this problem, see Keasbey, Notice of Assignments
in Equity (igio) ig YALE LAW JoURNAL, 258. See also NOTES (1912) 6o U. PA.
L. REv. 668; COMMENTS (1913) I CAIzF. L. REv. 364.
' For instance, in India, it is stated that it is possible to detect deception by the
movement of the big toe of the witness. Whenever the accused lies there is said
to be noticed a movement of the big toe. See Larson, The Berkeley Lie Detector
and other Deception Tests (1922) 47 A. B. A. REP. 61g.
'It was retained "not because the old superstition was indulged, but that its
effect on them [the accused]-the emotion produced and manifested-could be
observed." Brickell, C. J., in Gassenheimer v. State (1875) 52 Ala. 313; cf. State
v. Wisdom (1894) 119 Mo. 539, 24 S ,W. 1047.
' See Randall, Instructions to Juries (1922) secs. I53, 154.
"'Indeed we know it to be a fact, grounded in human nature, that the conduct
of a defendant or of a party to a suit during the trial is more or less potential,
and has necessarily more or less influence with the Court and jury upon the
question of credibility. . . . If this be so, we fail to perceive the vice in an
instruction telling the jury that they may do the very thing which common
experience and common observation teach that the human mind inevitably will do."
Campbell, J., in Boykin v. People (1896) 22 Colo. 496, 501, 45 Pac. 419, 421.
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of drugs and opiates upon testimonial capacity is allowed.5 All expert
testimony to some extent invades the province of the jury to determine
the credibility of witnesses, but there can be no objection to such testi-
mony provided that the deductions have a sufficient scientific basis.,
Modem psychology has added at least three tests which furnish some
scientific method of detecting conscious deception. The first to receive
popular attention was the measurement of the reaction times of associa-
tion, 7 promulgated by the German scientists, Gross" and Stem, 9 and
popularized by Miinsterberg.'0 While this method still has its propo-
nents,1 its efficacy when uncorroborated and unsupported seems yet
dubious.
Two additional methods, predicated somewhat upon a proven or
assumed identity of mental reaction with physiological change, have
been partially investigated. The work of the Italian, Benussi,
1 2
confirmed by Professor Burtt, indicates a remarkable correlation
between respiratory changes and conscious deception. They found a
characteristic rate of inspiration to expiration, symptomatic of "internal
"State v. Smith (i918) io3 Wash. 267, 174 Pac. 9 (morphine); McDowell v.
Preston (858) 26 Ga. 528 (laudanum); contra: Schuman v. State ('9,5) 89
Wash. 9, 153 Pac. 1084 (cocaine). So the specific tendency of a drug upon human
beings may be testified to. Champ v. Commonwealth (i859, Ky.) 2 Met. 17
(chloroform); .Reeve v. Dennett (1887) 145 Mass. 23, 11 N. E. 938 (white
lead). But court room demonstrations of the effect of the drug on another or
other individuals has not been allowed. Ohio County Drug Co. v. Howard (1923,
Ky.) 256 S. W. 705 (paraldehyde).
'Where mentality is in issue the psychiatrists are aiding by affording expert
evidence as to the mental capacity of the accused to perform the acts charged. See
People v. Williams (1922) 218 Mich. 697, 188 N. W. 413; No S (1923) 36
HAiv. L. REv. 333.
'A standard list of words or questions, alternated with words or questions
connected with the crime, is asked the witness; the questions often being written
on a revolving drum or thrown on a screen in order that the voice of the examiner
may not influence the experiment. From a comparison of the time which elapses
between the giving of the word and the answer, guilt is determined. An increase
in the time for response indicates guilty association about the question. Some
experimenters have discovered a type of so-called "negative" liars, whose reaction
time is shortened rather than increased by the suggestive qustions.
'Gross, Das Wahrhnhmungsproblem mnd der Zeuge im Stratprosess (19o2) 49
ARcxiv F. STRAFREC3H: U. STRAPROZESS, pt. 3; Gross, Ueber Zeugenpruefung
(1907) 3 MONATSCnRIFr F. KRImINAL-PsYcHOLOGIE, 577.
'Stern, Selbstverrat durch Asso-viation: experimentelle Untersuchungen (i9o6)
BEITRAEGE ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER AusSAGE, pt. I, p. I.
'
0In a scornful phillipic he indicted the legal profession for its failure to adopt
such tests as a part of court room procedure. Miinsterberg, On the Witness Stand
(i9o8). Dean Wigmore successfully acquitted the profession at that time;
showing that the methods were then little known, untrusted, and inexact.
Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony (1909) 3
ILL. L. REv. 399.
' See Langfeld, Psychophysical Symptoms of Deception (i922) 15 JouRNAL OF
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY, 319.
' Bennussi, Die Atnungssymptome der Luge (1914) 31 ARCHIV F. DIE GESAMTE
PSYCHOLOGIE, 244.
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excitement" caused by lying.3 And Marston,' 4 a pupil of Miinster-
berg, has measured the relation between conscious deception and systolic
blood pressure. In a number of laboratory and a few court room
experiences he has been able to detect conscious deception from
increased blood pressure records alone.' 5 But other investigators have
seen, they claim, "many cases of deception in which there was nothing
which according to Marston would indicate 'deception."16 Possibly the
most ambitious practical experiment has been the creation of the
"Berkeley Lie Detector" by Dr. Larson of the Berkeley Police Force
which combines these three methods and endeavors to secure a graphic
record of the respiratory and cardiac changes during the process of
deception, together with a record of association time reactions.Y7
In such a state of scientific doubt the recent case of Frye v. The
United States (1923, D. C.) 293 Fed. 1013, denied the use of a systolic
blood pressure device to test the credibility of the defendant.
Several objections to the immediate use of any of these tests have not
yet been overcome. The conditions in a laboratory are so dissimilar to
those of a court room as to justify questioning the use of even a proved
laboratory method. Again, one of the most important factors in pro-
ducing accelerated blood pressure or respiration is fear,'8 often present
when a suspected criminal is being examined about the details of the
crime but apt to be absent from a person deliberately lying in a civil
Burtt concludes, "Systolic blood pressure has a greater diagnostic value than
the breathing.... The lying consciousness appears to have an emotional (probably
fear) content and it is possible to influence expressive measurements somewhat by
emotional control. Some subjects successfully raise their blood pressure during T
[truth telling] by imaginary emotions. It is thus important to have other criteria
as a check." Burtt, The Irspiration-Expiration Ratio during Truth and Falsehood
(1921) 4 JOURNAL OF EXPEumENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1, 23.
SMarston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception (1917) 2 JOURNAL
OF ExPmuld-ENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 117; Marston, Psychological Possibilities in the
Deception Tests (1921) Ii JoUTRNAL OF CRImrNAL. LAW, 551; Marston, Reaction
Time Symptoms of Deception (1920) 5 ibid. 72.
"
5He concludes: "The behavior of the blood pressure does not act as the least
indicator of the objective validity of the story told by any witnesses, but it consti-
tutes a practically infallible test of the consciousness of an attitude of decep-
tion ..... Two records must be taken .... the story told during one record being
the truth within the knowledge of the examiner. The examination should be
private with carefully controlled conditions... . The records should be interpreted
by a psychologist experienced in this particular line .... and above all it should
be compared minutely with the record known to be symptomatic of that individual's
consciousness while telling the truth." Marston, Systolic Blood Pressure, supra
note 14, at p. 163.
"Larson, op. cit. supra note I, at pp. 623, 624.
"Larson, Modification of the Marston Deception Test (1921) 12 JOURNAL OF
CRIMINAL LAW, 390; Larson, op. cit. supra note I; NOTES (1922) 13 JOURNAL OF
CRzIMINAL LAW, 121; Larson, The Cardio-Pneumo-Psychogram and its Use in the
Study of Emotions (I92) 5 JOURNAL OF EXPFRMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 323.
S "Is fear, then, the sole emotional element in the deceptive consciousness? It
seems probable that, during a majority of the deception, it is." Marston, Systolic
Blood Pressure, supra note 14, at p. 154.
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case, as concerning the terms of an offer, or the blowing of a locomotive
whistle. Especially is this so when the witness is not a party to the
suit.19 And then, of course, none of these tests purport to do more than
detect conscious lying. Freedom from deliberate deception affords
but little guaranty to the validity of testimony; it in no way remedies
the defects of memory, detects the additions of imagination, the effects
of suggestion, or the products of the "will to believe." 20
It is trite to abuse the courts for not accepting the advances of science.
The condemnation is undeserved unless science has advanced. Even,
scientists are agreed that "there is no test in its present state which is
suitable for the positive identification of deception and suitable for court
procedure." 21
APPORTIONMENT OF CORPORATE EARNINGS BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND
REMAINDERMAN UNDER A TRUST ESTATE
The question whether a distribution made by a corporation during
the continuance of a trust estate belongs to the cestui with a life interest
or passes to the remainderman as part of the corpus of the estate is
primarily a question of the intention manifested by the instrument
under which the trust was created.1 Frequently, however, the language
of the instrument is not sufficiently explicit to furnish a rule for the
guidance of the court when the distribution by the corporation is some-
thing other than a regular dividend out of current earnings.2  It has
therefore' been necessary when the intention of the settlor cannot be
ascertained to devise rules of thumb more or less arbitrary in character.
A common type of case involves the distribution of stock dividends
'May not part of the success had in detecting conscious deception in criminals
be attributed to the fact that the use of such a test as a part of the "third degree"
method would induce truth telling-regardless of its inherent capability to detect
deliberate falsehood? If the criminal could be led to believe that the device would
detect deception, regardless of whether in fact it could or not, would that not
influence the blood pressure during deception more than mere deception freed from
such a fear?
See Morgan, A Study in the Psychology of Testimony (1917) 8 JoURNAL OF
CRIMINAL LAw, 222; Morgan, The Evaluation of Courtroom Testimony (1916)
7 JoURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, 227; Miinsterberg, op. cit. supra note IO.
2 tLarson, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 628; cf. "It should be noted, however, that
this blood pressure test was never alleged to be a simple cure-all or patent medi-
cine automatically detecting every deception on the part of the subject." Marston,
Psychological Possibilities, supra note 14, at p. 553; "Without data drawn from
thousands of cases of deception from all types of temperaments under all condi-
tions a judicial decision will be impossible," Larson, The Cardio-Pneumo-Psycho-
grain in Deception (1923) 6 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCnOloGY, 420, 426;
see (924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 429.
'Spooner v. Phillips (1892) 62 Conn. 62, 24 Atl. 524. See Gibbons z. Mahon
(i8go) 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. I057; Thomas v. Gregg (1894) 78 Md. 545, 28
Atl. 565.
2 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 769, note.
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and cash dividends. The early English rule gave all extraordinary cash
and stock dividends to the remainderman as part of the trust fund.3
This rule, obviously unfair to the life tenant, has been repudiated by
later English decisions which have adopted what is known in this
country as the Massachusetts rule.4  According to this rule all stock
dividends belong to the corpus and all cash dividends belong to the life
tenant.' It has been followed by some courts because of the simplicity
of its application;6 but it has also been criticized for its arbitrary
character.7
A different rule commonly called the Pennsylvania rule apportions
extraordinary dividends between the life tenant and remainderman
according to whether the fund out of which the dividends is paid
accrued before or after the creation of the life estate. If it has been
earned before the life estate arose, it belongs to the remainderman as
part of the corpus of the estate; if it has accrued after the life estate
arose, the dividend is part of the income and belongs to the life tenant.'
The rule proceeds upon the theory that in disposing of the dividend the
court may properly inquire into the time it was earned or accumulated.
This is apparently the majority American view.9
Brander v. Brander (1799, Ch.) 4 Ves. Jr. 8oo. The inconvenience of investi-
gating the corporation's books and the practical ease of applying this rule, seems
to have been the cause for its adoption. (1920) 5 VA. L. REa. (N. s.) 484. At
least one English 'decision implies that its confirmation may be due to influence
brought to bear by the Bank of England, when, to the consternation of its direc-
tors, the court intimated its intention of going over the bank's records in order
to apportion the dividends between the rival claimants. Irving v. Houston (18o3,
H. L.) 4 Paton, 521.
'Bouch v. Sproule (1887, H. L.) L. R. 12 A. C. 385; (i916) 82 CENT. L.
Joua. 15. For the gradual development of the English rule see (,923) 23 CoL. L.
REv. 369. According to this rule earnings of the corporation are not necessarily
earnings or income of the trust. The directors, having supreme control of the
corporation's affairs, may treat the earnings as suitable for distribution in cash or
for the increase of capital, and their determination is final. See (1919) 3 MINN.
L. REv. 204.
"Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. io1.
'Security Trust Co. v. Ramrnelsburg (1918) 82 W. Va. 7O, 97 S. E. 122;
Talbot v. Milliken (9,5) 221 Mass. 367, io8 N. E. io6o; Richardson v. Richard-
son (3884) 75 Me. 570; DeKoven v. Alsop (19o3) 205 Ill. 309, 68 N. E. 930;
Gibbons v. Mahon, supra note I; Lanston v. Lanston (1923, App. D. C.) 290
Fed. 315.
It seems that the Massachusetts court itself has failed to apply this ruling in
hard cases. Gray v. Heinei'way (1912) 212 Mass. 239, 98 Mass. 789; Smith v.
Cotting (1918) 231 Mass. 42, 12o N. E. 177; Heard v. Eldredge (1872) 1og Mass.
258.
'Earp's Appeal (1857) 28 Pa. 368; In re Kernochan (1887) 3O4 N. Y. 618, 11
N. E. 149; In re Sith's Estate (1893) 34o Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438; Spooner v.
Phillips, supra note i.
'(192o) 68 U. PA. L. REv. 85. While the New York decisions are in confusion,
the later cases tend to adopt the Pennsylvania ruling. United States Trust Co. v.
Heye (1918) 224 N. Y. 242, 12o N. E. 645; Matter of Schaeffer (917, Ist Dept.)
178 App. Div. 117, 165 N. Y. Supp. 17.
28
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While the Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania views constitute the
two main currents of authority, there is considerable inconsistency in
the decisions of the courts of the several states, and sometimes even
within the same state. For example, in Kentucky stock or cash divi-
dends declared during the term of the life estate belong to the life
tenant.10 In Maryland, all cash dividends belong to the life tenant,'"
but stock dividends are apportioned according to the Pennsylvania
rule.Y2 The reason for the confusion is probably in some degree
traceable to the fact that the private corporation is a comparatively
recent development in our economic structure, and the courts have
found little assistance in common law precedent. Of the various rules
of apportionment the Pennsylvania rule seems the most equitable in its
application.
In the recent case of Girwood v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1923,
Md.) 122 AtI. 132, the problem arose with respect to stock rights.
Following the generally recognized rule the court held that the right
to subscribe for additional shares of stock and any benefit accruing from
such a right enured to the remainderman as part of the corpus of the
estate. 3 The courts have refused to consider that the profit accruing
from the stock right may have been made possible by the surplus earned
by the corporation since the establishment of the trust, and in order
that the life tenant be entitled to any or all of this profit, a declaration
of an actual dividend is required. The endeavor is to prevent an
impairment of the corpus by a division of the voting power and the
assets. It has been contended that there is no reason for applying a
different rule of apportionment to stock rights than is applied to stock
or cash dividends.'- But to ascertain exactly an apportionment of the
profit accruing from the stock right would involve a highly complicated
problem of accounting. When the courts are called upon to apply exist-
ing notions of justice to the solution of complex economic problems
they must either lay down arbitrary rules or else resort to principles of
political economy and accounting which few judges are competent to
deal with on a large scale. Furthermore, if a corporation finds that its
business justifies a larger capitalization, may it not be attributed to an
increase in the business of the corporation and not to a surplus reserved
by the corporation? To apply any rule other than a rule of thumb
would be confusing in the extreme and in the majority of the cases
perhaps unjust.
, Hite's Decision v. Hite's Ex'r (1892) 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778; Cox v.
Gaulbert Trustee (1912) 148 Ky. 4o7, 147 S. W. 25.
1 Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (i9ox) 93 Md. 285, 48 AtI. 835; Northern
Cent. Dividend Cases (I915) 126 Md. 16, 94 AtI. 338.
'Thontas v. Gregg (1894) 78 Md. 545, 28 Adt. 565; Miller v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. (1916) 127 Md. 6io, 96 AtI. 766.
" Baker v. Thompson (1918, ist Dept.) i8i App. Div. 469, 168 N. Y. Supp. 871;
DeKoven v. Alsop, supra note 6.4See (1918) 18 CoL. L. REv. 496.
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RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES BY PROXY ABROAD
At common law the mutual consent of both parties per verba de
praesenti sufficed without more to create the marital status.' This
informal mode of entering matrimony still obtains in most of the states.
2
Since the mutual consent need not be expressed by the parties in the
presence of each other,3 a contract of marriage may be effected by
correspondence,4 and an instance of a wedding by telephone has even
been noted.5 The English courts had early adopted the provisions of
the canon law recognizing the validity of marriages by proxy, and this
was not abrogated at least until the eighteenth century.
6 The historical
argument thus is in support of these unusual nuptials, and eminent
writers have frequently asserted their validity in common law states.
7
Two recent cases involving marriages by proxy raise the question for
the first time, apparently, in Anglo-American law.
Lorenz v. Lorenz (1924, Fed. D. C. S. D. N. Y.) 70 NST. Y. L. JouR.
121, arose under the Immigration Act which limits the yearly number
of Spanish immigrants that may enter this country. A bride and her
father who was authorized to represent an alien resident of New York
went through the ceremony in Spain where marriage by proxy is
allowed. The "wife" later attempted to enter this country but was
excluded because the quota of Spanish immigrants had been filled.
Under the Immigration Act, however, the wife of a resident is per-
'See Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811, Consistory Court of London) 2 Hag. Con.
54, iO3; Dumaresly v. Fishly (1821) i0 Ky. 368; Jackson v. Winne (1831, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 7 Wend. 47; 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce and Separation (6th ed.
1921) sec. 26; Koegel, Common Law Marriage (1922) 116.
'Koegel, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 164; see L. R. A. 1915 E, i9, note; Ann.
Cas. 1912 D, 598, note.
'Noms (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 848, 850; i Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and
Separation (I891) see. 323; contra: The Breadalbane Case [1867, H. L.] i L. R.
SC. 182, 199.
k United States v. Great Northern Ry. (igi8, C. C. A. 9th) 254 Fed. 522; 2
Schouler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 1458; see an opinion of the Judge Advocate
'General, Dec. 21, 1918.
(1919) 4 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 636.
'Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws (1919) 32 HARv. L.
REv. 473; Swinburne, Spousals (2d ed. 1711) 162. The common law was abro-
gated in England by the Marriage Act (1836) 6 & 7 Will. IV, c. 85, sec. :0;
Marriage Act (1898) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 58, sec. 6.
' Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 482. See also Beale, Progress of the
Law, .p98-y9 (1919) 33 HA~v. L. REv. I, 13; Goodrich, Foreign Marriage and the
Conflict of Laws (1923) 21 Micn. L. RPv. 743, 747. There are a few scattered
dicta to the contrary. Commonwealth v. Farmers' & Shippers' Tobacco Ware-
house Co. (1899) 1o7 Ky. I, 52 S. W. 799 (too personal to be done by agent);
Republic of Hawaii v. Li Shee (1899) 12 Haw. 329 (contrary to our notions);
see also Tiffany, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 192) 54; 1 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.
1914) sec. 126.
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mitted to enter irrespective of the quota.' On a petition of habeas
corpus, the court held that the marriage by proxy would be recognized,
and the wife was entitled to enter. Since the question was presented
from the viewpoint of the conflict of laws, a decision on the validity of
a local marriage by proxy was not invited. From the international
aspect the local rule is of no concern.
As to the mode of marriage it is uniformly held that the law of the
place of celebration controls,9 and even as to caphcity1° "a marriage
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere" unless it shocks the moral
sense of civilized society11 or violates some positive local policy of the
fortUm. 12 The courts tend strongly to sustain the marital status where-
ever possible. A foreign "common law" marriage is recognized in
the state where the parties are domiciled though the law of the domicile
does not permit the informal ceremony.13 It seems then that if both
parties are present in a foreign state where marriages by proxy are
allowed and do marry by proxy, they would be considered as man and
wife everywhere. Is there any reason for an opposite result when one
or both are not present in the foreign state? A possible objection -is
that evasion of the local law is facilitated. But persons about to be
married are eager to be as near to each other as possible, and marriage
in absenta will occur only when an exigency such as the recent war
requires it. The paucity of cases on marriages by proxy is significant.
It is also suggested that complications might ensue from a revocation of
the proxy's authority without the knowledge of the other party, 4 but
rarely indeed will there be a rapid change of heart on so momentous a
decision, which is more likely to be well-deliberated when arrived at
' United States, ex rel. Markarian, v. Tod (1923, C. C. A. 2d) 290 Fed. 198.
'Clark v. Clark (1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 65o,'3o Atl. 81; Minor, Conflicts (igoi)
sec. 77; Dicey, Conflicts (3d ed. 1922) 661; Baty, Capacity and Form of Mar-
riage in the Conflict of Laws (1917) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 444; Dicey, Chetti
v. Chetti (igog) 25 L. QuAmr. REv. 202.
" Commonwealth v. Lane (1873) 113 Mass. 458; Beale, The Law of Capacity
in International Marriages (Igoz) 15 HARV. L. REv. 382; Goodrich, op. cit. supra
note 7, at p. 749; NoTEs (1911) II Coi. L. REv. 767; (1913) 6 HARv. L. REv.,
536; 43 L. R. A. (w. s.) 355, note; Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1O74, note. Contra:
State v. Fenn (igo7) 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417.
' United States v. Rodgers (goi, E. D. Pa.) iog Fed. 886 (incestuous); In re
Bethell (1888) L. R. 38 Ch. Div =o (polygamous); Minor, op. cit. supra note 9,
sec. 75.
" Kinney v. Commonwealth (x878, Va.) 3o Gratt. 858 (negro and white); but
see State v. Ross (1877) 76 N. C. 242; Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp (1923, Okla.)
216 Pac. 467 (statutory prohibition) ; COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
426, 429.
'This is true even though the parties go out of the state to evade the local
law. Clark v. Clark, supra note 9; Petras v. Petras (1gi9, Del. Super Ct.) 7
Boyce, 29o, 105 Atl. 835; Nelson v. Carlson (908) 48 Wash. 65I, 94 Pac. 477;
Darling v. Dent (I9O7) 82 Ark. 76, IOO S. W. 747; see Medway v. Needham
(1819) 16 Mass. 157; contra: Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 341,
99 N. E. 845.
" 'See Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 482.
COMMENTS
away from the enchantress. 15 There is a dictum to the effect that a
nation lacks the power to impose a status upon one not present in, or
domiciled within its boundaries. 16  Such a statement assumes the exist-
ence of a higher sovereign that delegates power in a given situation to
this nation, or denies it to that. The question can only be answered
empirically on considerations of policy and convenience.'
7  It is best
that people be recognized as everywhere married, or everywhere nn
t
-
And this result is accomplished only by allowing the lex loci celebra-
tionis to control.'3
Professor Goodrich suggests that a marriage valid where celebrated
ought not to be recognized abroad if invalid under the private inter-
national law of the domicile.' 9 This view seems to have been taken in
the other recent case involving marriage by proxy. In In Re Sabinna
Suzanna (Jan. 28, 1924, D. Mass.) a domiciled citizen of Pennsylvania
was married by proxy to an illiterate woman domiciled in Portugal.
The ceremony was performed in Portugal, in compliance with the local
law. The wife was later denied admission to this country under a
statute providing that an illiterate woman could enter only as the wife
of a resident. On determining that the marriage would have been
recognized in Pennsylvania the court granted habeas corpus. The case
involves an application of renvoi,2 0 inasmuch as the policy of the domi-
cile in regard to the formalities of a foreign marriage is substituted for
that of the forum. This does not affect the result, however, for it is
uniformly held, even at the domicile, that the lex loci governs.
2
' In
theory, such an application of renvoi seems unsound.
22  Domicile is
frequently difficult to ascertain. Once ascertained, its policy is often
obscure, and in the absence of a decision by its courts, as in the instant
case, it must be defined by the forum. And if the parties are domiciled
in different jurisdictions, the conflict of laws of both domiciles is to be
satisfied as well as the internal law of the place of celebration. If
invalid by either law, the marriage will fall. Such a rule contravenes
the constant policy of the courts to uphold the marital status.
1 NoTEs (919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 851, note 20.
"In re Lum Lin Ying (1894, D. Or.) 59 Fed. 682, 683.
'See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457.
is x Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and'Separation (i8gi) sec 845.
' Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 751. The proposition is sustained by
scant authority. See, however, State v. Fenn, supra note iO; People v. Steere
(915) 184 Mich. 556, I51 N. W. 617. For an able exposition of the opposite
view see i Bishop, op. cit. supra note 18, secs. 848-851, 872-885.
" See Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law (igo)
io CoL L. Rlv. 19o, 327; The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Law (1918) 27
YALE LAW JouRNAL, 509; Abbott, Is the Renvoi a Part of the Common Law?
(19o8) 24 L. QuART. REv. 133; Schreiber, The Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo-
Amterican Law (1918) 3 HARv. L. REV. 523; Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329,
132 N. E. io6 (divorce); COmmENTS (19) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 191.
' Supra note 9.
"See, however, In re Lando's Estate (i9io) 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W., 1125.
